Response to Oxford Analytical on mocking Patriarch video
Thanks for passing this on this article (attached below).
Honestly, I can't say I'm an insider or an expert on this stuff. My own impression and opinion is that the Georgian Church is quite disorganized, and while it is possible that there are various factions within the Church that are somehow "pro-Russia" as in "pro-Orthodox," these represent only a small minority and don't speak for the Church as a whole. Radical Christian Orthodoxy tends to be paranoid about the non-Orthodox world, which is ruled by a consortium of Free Masons, Jews, Atheists, and Devil-Worshippers. I don't really know how much of that stuff is going on in Georgia, it seems to be mostly coming out of Russia.
Anyway, nothing I've witnessed makes the Georgian Church pro-Russian. It is not the "most-Russophile" element of Georgian society at all. In fact, the Georgian Church has suffered a terrible history of oppression from the Russian Church. The Georgian Church perceives itself as independent, that is the most important thing. Right now, I think the Patriarch has pros/cons. His pros are that his "political" statements rely on spiritual values (stop the war because killing is bad), so he doesn't get caught up in day to day political rhetoric about whether one person is better than another, or whether such and such was wrong, etc. Also, he is a spiritual leader, and he spends a lot of time in services, and praying, which says a lot. His cons, if one could even see them that way, are that he is not a good administrator, and doesn't have the youthful energy to manage his top-ranked "team" effectively, etc. so his organization is kind of ad-hoc. For example, the manager of the Patriarchate is this dictator lady that no one can stand working with, but the Patriarch doesn't dismiss her because he sees her higher spiritual side and knows that she is working towards becoming a better person... in other words, he is forgiving, at the forfeit of running an effective management team. Georgians at the Patriarchate tend to see this simpleness from him as a sign of spirituality, and blame the lady in charge for not being a better organizer.
In any case, my take is that the media has really taken this video business to the point it's at now, allowing the pundits to write up articles expressing their own preconceptions and prejudices. I agree Saakashvili has to move more towards populism, but in fact, he has been there from the beginning of his term. To my knowledge, he hasn't gone against the Church at all while in office, so it's not as if he is making a big shift all of a sudden.
Another point of disagreement: that Church members became anti-Saakashvili because his police put the radical, de-frocked, Jehovah's Witness hating priest in jail. Most Orthodox I know were relieved. I don't think that anyone can claim that political lines follow religious lines in Georgia. With 80% claiming to be Orthodox, that encompasses the whole political spectrum already. Of the anti-Saakashvili folks in Georgia (most people it seems), I would guess that very few base their opinions on some slight to the Church. Most are pissed because he put their buddies in jail, shut down liberal media outlets, sent out riot police on Nov. 7th, and taxes everyone. I think very few people dislike Saakashvili for poor decision making in terms of the August 8th, 2008 war with Russia, given that most Georgians that I know think that South Ossetia and Abkhazia are being held hostage by a Russian supported corrupt elite who do whatever Russia tells them to do. So most people agree that it was good to have a status change in terms of world recognition that Russia was falsely supporting secessionist regions created largely by Tsarist and Stalinist policies. Most Georgians that I know just wish that Georgia could have regained the territories and established a peaceful, whole country again. There is a bit of idealism going on here that has to do with long, long memories. People regularly talk about the Georgian borders of 1000 years ago, or the migrations of Ossetians 400 years ago as if it was yesterday.
I bet the Patriarch would have had a sense of humor about the video. But Georgians are political, and so some anti-Saakashvili folks decided it was time to take a few punches at the administration under the guise of Church outrage. I think it's a good thing the video has received so much press, so that it brings up important questions of identity, etc. as the article mentions, but also so that it doesn't happen again and again.
Enough of a rant.
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GEORGIA: Church row points to post-war soul-searching
Thursday, November 12 2009
Oxford Analytica
SUBJECT: The row over a video mocking the head of the Orthodox Church.
SIGNIFICANCE: The controversy has sparked a passionate discussion on freedoms of debate and religion, tolerance and identity. It exposes the political and social fissures in post-war Georgia, with a reformist administration turning more traditionalist, and the liberal intelligentsia regaining its political voice.
ANALYSIS: Scandal broke out in mid-October, after Tea Tutberidze, a former activist of the Liberty Institute non-governmental organisation (NGO) known to be close to President Mikheil Saakashvili, posted an anonymous video on her Facebook account. In the video, an animated photograph of the leader of the Georgian Orthodox Church, Catholicos-Patriarch Ilia II, is represented as using crude language to abuse Saakashvili. The video triggered a wave of indignation from religious groups, which alleged an orchestrated assault by the state on the authority of the Orthodox Church. Some went so far as to issue death and rape threats against Tutberidze, on the internet and in the press.
The presidential administration condemned the video in an official statement, while the police and prosecution service announced an investigation into the case. However, despite a request from Ombudsman Giorgi Tughushi, the prosecution was unable to cite any legal grounds for the investigation. The police questioned a 16-year-old and an 18-year-old university student suspected of making the video. Both denied involvement; no formal charges have been brought. The police action appears to have been a political nod towards the Patriarchy and pro-Orthodox voters; no further action is expected.
Ideological conflict. The heat of the debate recalls the early days of the Saakashvili administration. Backed by a liberal team of NGO activists and riding a wave of popular support, the president's National Movement championed a 'liberal cultural revolution'. It also stood for the protection of religious minorities against radical Orthodox assault. This drive reached its peak in 2004, when the police raided a church run by the leader of the most radical wing, a defrocked priest, and detained him on charges of stoking religious hatred. Since then, traditionalist voters have demonised Saakashvili and his supporters as 'church-busters'.
As Saakashvili grew weaker, these voices grew stronger and were also heard from the Patriarchy. In recent years, in his traditional Easter epistle, the patriarch has consistently advanced an ideological platform opposed to the liberal and pro-European rhetoric of the Saakashvili administration, speaking of the demoralising influence of television, the internet and globalisation, and calling for reclaiming traditional Georgian values of agriculture, the family and religion.
Pro-Russian Church. After the 2008 war over South Ossetia, the Georgian Orthodox Church maintained a conciliatory line towards Russia. To the chagrin of the government, some more radical Orthodox figures preached about God's 'holy punishment', through the agency of the Russian army, for Georgia's European (and so, un-Orthodox) ambitions. However, Ilia II played a crucial role in recovering the bodies of Georgian soldiers from South Ossetia. He also headed the first delegation to visit Russia after the war and met senior Russian officials. At the time, Saakashvili hinted that the visit had been coordinated with the government. At a meeting in Baku last week, Ilia and Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Russia, described by an official of the Moscow Patriarchate's Department for External Church Relations as "old friends", agreed to make every effort to restore "warm brotherly relations" between their two peoples and states.
There are strong suspicions within Georgia's liberal elite that the Church is dominated by bishops and priests educated in Russia. Critics also claim that the Church was a traditional area of influence for the Soviet KGB. Although there is no substantiation for such talk, the Orthodox Church remains one of the most Russophile elements in Georgian society.
Political conflict. Trusted by no less than 95% of Georgians (according to polls), with about 80% describing themselves as Orthodox Christians, the Church is a formidable political force. Saakashvili is badly wounded politically after the Russo-Georgian war, and cannot afford to alienate the Church. Hence, liberals fear a steady populist trend, which appeases the Church's least tolerant followers and suppresses free speech and diversity.
Ilia II has, so far, articulated his ideological opposition to the government's line, but skilfully avoided being manipulated during the stand-off between Saakashvili and the irreconcilable opposition in mid-2009. As he is ageing and frail, there are fears that after his departure, the reins could fall into the hands of a less neutral figure. Therefore, all sides in Georgian politics are staking a claim to religious credibility. Symptomatically, Sozar Subari, the former ombudsman, an ardent critic of the Saakashvili government and currently a member of the liberal opposition Alliance for Georgia, has chosen to view the latest conflict from the viewpoint of 'defamation of religion' rather than the right to free speech of the video's producers.
Defamation of religion is a relatively new concept, arising from the notorious cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed in a Danish newspaper. Usually, freedom of speech is absolute and only restricted as regards defamation of an individual, not a group. Defamation of religion is more restrictive of freedom of speech, at least as that right has traditionally been understood.
Rule of law undermined. The scandal further undermined the credibility of the police and prosecution service, which are seen as doing the government's political bidding, rather than applying the law. An interview emerged with one of the youths questioned, who claimed police investigators had asked him about his religious beliefs and practices. Such allegations remain unaddressed by the political leadership and the police. Failure to state publicly the grounds for an investigation is illegal, while failure to address the death threats and hate speech against Tutberidze creates the impression that law enforcement bodies are afraid to go against the dominant public opinion, even if it is against the law.
Lifting of taboos. Despite its strong political undertones, the current debate revives an earlier one which touches on ambiguities about fundamental freedoms, the constitutional principle of a secular republic and, above all, the relation between Georgians' ethnic identity and the identity of the Georgian state (see GEORGIA: Minorities are set for increased role - January 12, 2009). The quality of debate is low, it is limited to a few intellectuals and passions run high. Yet, through this discussion, Georgia's small group of intellectuals are reclaiming their role as a driving force in the political debate from the Saakashvili administration, which largely co-opted them in 2004-07. During 2007-09, the debate simmered within a small group on such forums as Facebook, YouTube, the blogosphere and the internet. As the soul-searching widens, it is seeping into the mainstream media and is being received aggressively by the majority.
Outlook. Indications that people can be prosecuted for expressing opinions, and the political emergence of religious fundamentalism against the background of a weak government are sources of concern. However, if the debate continues, Georgia could make significant strides in bringing fundamental questions of belief and identity within the democratic process of the clash of ideas. The Russo-Georgian war has removed from the immediate political agenda Abkhazia and South Ossetia, formerly an ideologically safe rallying-point for Georgia's body politic. The resulting confusion could become a fertile ground for a more genuine democratic consensus on Georgia's identity, past and -- crucially -- future.
CONCLUSION: An important social debate is simmering in Georgia, seeking an outlet. Under pressure at home and abroad, Saakashvili is moving towards the populist middle ground. The liberal political project is alive, but is under threaten from an emerging political traditionalism, with Russophile undertones.